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FEDERAL QUESTIONS, STATE COURTS,
AND THE LOCKSTEP DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION

State courts have adopted the doctrine that if presented with a
federal question, they are not bound by the decisions of any federal
court interpreting that law except the United States Supreme Court.
The theory is that federal courts were originally created to be
coordinate with state courts; with the exception of the highest court in
the land, federal courts were not seen as superior to their state
counterparts. As such, state courts are presumed to be free of
precedent of the federal courts that decided federal law in the
jurisdiction in which the state court sat, even if the circuit court had
ruled on the matter. State courts adopted several approaches in their
interpretation of the law, some more deferential to federal decisions
than others, but the overwhelming majority of courts viewed the
federal decisions as merely persuasive.
In 2004, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether Pennsylvania state courts would be bound by the
pronouncements of federal law by inferior federal courts or whether
the courts would decide these issues independently. In Hall v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probationand Parole,1 the prisoner Hall filed
a pro se petition for a review in the nature of a request for mandamus
to challenge application of the 1996 amendments of the Federal
Parole Act. Hall had been serving time for a variety of assault-related
convictions. 2 From 1996 through 1999, Hall appeared before the
Parole Board, each time having his parole request rejected.3 In 2002,
Hall filed his pro se petition in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court, claiming that the Parole Board's application of the 1996
amendments to the Parole Act to his parole requests violated the

1 851 A.2d 859, 860 (Pa. 2004).
2

Id.

3

Id.
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constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.4 The
Commonwealth Court ultimately denied the petition, and Hall
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for review.5
Pennsylvania courts had rejected the ex post facto argument raised by
the prisoner in Winklespecht v. Pennsylvania Board of Probationand
Parole6 and in Finnegan v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole.7 Seven weeks after Winklespecht, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the Winklespecht rationale in a case with an identical
substantive contention, holding that applying the 1996 amendments of
the Parole Act to the defendant violated the ex post facto prohibitions
of the United States Constitution.8 Hall, recognizing the divergence in
state and federal rulings, asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to
consider his ex post facto argument in light of the Third Circuit's
recent decision. 9
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in considering the merits of the
appeal, was faced with the question of whether or not their court-a
state court-had any responsibility to treat the pronouncements of
inferior federal courts on matters of federal law as binding, namely
the amendments to the Parole Act at issue.' 0 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court recognized that states had varying approaches to this
issue, with only a very small minority of states treating lower federal
court's rulings as binding on federal matters." As for Pennsylvania's
historical approach to the issue, the court considered its ruling in
Commonwealth v. Negri12 in 1965. In Negri, the court had to decide13
whether it would follow a state interpretation of Escobedo v. Illinois
or the conflicting analysis of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Negri court considered some of the policy implications of not treating
the Third Circuit's pronouncements as binding and therefore
dispositive:
If the Pennsylvania courts refuse to abide by [the Third
Circuit's] conclusions, then the individual to whom we deny
relief need only to "walk across the street" to gain a different
4 Id. at 860-61.

Id. at 861.

5

813 A.2d 688, 692 (Pa. 2002).
7 838 A.2d 684, 690 (Pa. 2003).
6

8

See Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 321 F.3d 374, 393 (3d Cir. 2003).

9 Hall, 851 A.2d at 863.
10 Id.

II Id. at 863-64.
12 213 A.2d 670 (Pa. 1965).
13 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (ruling on right to counsel, interrogation, and confessions in the
context of Constitutional constraints as a predecessor to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
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result. Such an unfortunate situation would cause disrespect
for the law. It would also result in adding to the already
burdensome problems of the Commonwealth's trial courts,
which look to us for guidance. Finality of judgments would
become illusory, disposition of litigation prolonged for years,
the business of the courts unnecessarily clogged,
and justice
4
intolerably delayed and frequently denied.1
Despite these concerns of unevenness in the law, lack of judicial
economy, judicial confusion, and overall disrespect for the federal
law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Negri chose to dispense with
the Third Circuit's interpretation of Escobedo and stick with the
state's version of the law. 15 Since Negri, a number of decisions
affirmed Negri's conclusion that Pennsylvania state courts were not
bound by lower federal courts' rulings on matters of federal law
brought into a state courtroom.' 6 As such, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Hall elected to continue the doctrine that the court could
decide federal matters independently of the Third Circuit, or any
federal circuit courts of appeals for that matter, 17 for reasons of
keeping continuity with precedent. 18 The Hall court affirmed the
order of the Commonwealth court and its use of the Winklespecht
analysis.
This Note argues that there is a better way for state courts to
interpret federal law when a federal question is presented to a state
court than the one the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted. This
approach is called the Lockstep Doctrine. This doctrine is premised
on the idea that one court will treat as binding another court's
interpretation of a law not because it has to, but because of the
benefits that such an approach generates. When state courts follow the
decisions of an inferior federal court on an issue of federal law, the
federal law sees improvement: a reduction in the abuses of forum
14 Negri, 213 A.2d at 672.

15 Id. at 676.
16 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ragan, 743 A.2d 390, 396 (Pa. 1999) ("[Un interpreting
federal case law, this Court is not bound by decisions of federal courts inferior to the United
States Supreme Court."); Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242, 1256-57 n.14 (Pa. 1999)
("[A]ithough we may look to decisions of the intermediate federal courts for guidance in
interpreting federal case law, those decisions are not binding on this court."); Commonwealth v.
Laird, 726 A.2d 346, 359 n.12 (Pa. 1999) ("[A]lthough we may look to decisions of the
intermediate federal courts for guidance in interpreting federal case law, those decisions are not
binding on this court."); Commonwealth v. Cross, 726 A.2d 333, 338 n.4 (Pa. 1999) ("This
court is not bound by a lower federal court's interpretation of United States Supreme Court
decisions, but is bound only by the United States Supreme Court.").
17 See Breckline v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 178 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1962) (ruling that a Ninth
Circuit decision is not binding on the court).
18Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 865 (Pa. 2004).
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shopping, better consistency in the application of the federal law, a
higher quality in the adjudication of federal laws generally, and the
promotion of equal protection of the law.
This Note will begin with a historical review of how state courts
have addressed federal questions, and then will examine the current
approaches by way of an analysis of case law. Second, this Note will
demonstrate the Lockstep Doctrine in practice as it is currently used
by state courts in the adjudication of state constitutional rights.
Finally, this Note will propose an application of the Lockstep
Doctrine to federal questions brought before state courts and discuss
the benefits that would flow from such an approach.

I.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

There is no serious dispute that state courts are available to hear
matters of federal law. The Constitution created a Supreme Court and
gave it jurisdiction over all cases in law and equity arising under the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.1 9 The
Constitution, of course, did not mandate the creation of any inferior
federal courts, putting the creation of lower federal courts in the sole
discretion of Congress. 20 Though Congress instituted a system of
lower federal courts,2 1 the early inferential understanding was that
state courts could decide issues of federal law, since, theoretically,
federal courts were discretionary and not necessary. Moreover, even
though the First Congress created a system of lower federal courts, it
did not give the lower federal courts general civil jurisdiction.22 As
such, nearly all civil cases arising under federal law had to be brought
in state court.23 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that "state
courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent,
to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States." 24
This view that state courts are competent to hear federal questions
was recognized very early. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 25 the
Supreme Court held that state courts are presumptively capable of
hearing federal questions since there is no mandate for inferior federal
19U.S. CONST. art. HI,§§ 1-2.
2 Id.
21 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2-4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75 (creating federal district and
circuit courts).
22For a detailed overview of the history of the early jurisdiction of federal courts, see
Donald. H. Zeigler, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the StandardsState Judges
Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1147 n.14 (1999)
(examining the history that litigants were forced to bring civil cases in state court).
23 Id.

24 Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S 455, 458 (1990).
25 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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courts to hear them: "[federal courts] may not exist; and, therefore,
the appellate jurisdiction must extend beyond appeals from the courts
of the United States only. The state courts are to adjudicate under the
supreme law of the land, as a rule binding upon them.",26 Unless
exclusive jurisdiction is express or implied, state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to decide federal matters.2 7
Over time, the number of federal laws has grown substantially,
affected by such events as the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the
Great Depression. Before these seminal historical events, Congress
used its legislative powers sparingly. 8 Since then, the federal
government has become much more active, and with that activity
came thousands more federal statutes. In the early part of the nation's
existence, the low number of federal statutes naturally meant that
state courts did not deal with the issue of deciding matters of federal
law very often. Nowadays, with so many federal laws and regulations
on the books, state courts are more likely to be faced with a federal
question in a state courtroom.
IE.CURRENT APPROACHES

While it is clear that state courts have the inherent power to decide
cases brought under federal law, there is no prevailing standard for
how states should interpret the law. Hall v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probationand Parole recognized four schools of thought addressing
the issue of how states treat the pronouncements of inferior federal
courts on federal law: (1) a decision of an inferior federal court is
persuasive authority, but not binding; (2) a decision of an inferior
federal court should be followed, if reasonably possible, to avoid a
conflict between state and federal interpretations of the same law; (3)
a decision of an inferior federal court is binding on the state court;
and (4) the state court is bound by inferior federal court decisions on
the law in question if they are "numerous and consistent. 29
26 Id. at 315; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."). The operative word is "may": inferior federal courts are not
required by the Constitution to hear cases, so it follows that state courts are competent tribunals.
27 Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 459; see also Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
477-78 (1981) ("The general principle of state-court jurisdiction over cases arising under
federal laws is straightforward: state courts may assume subject-matter jurisdiction over a
federal cause of action absent provision by Congress to the contrary or disabling incompatibility
between the federal claim and state-court adjudication."); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502, 507 (1962) ("[N]othing in the concept of our federal system prevents state courts
from enforcing rights created by federal law.").
28 See Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1020 (1977)
(examining the short supply of federal statutes during the first century of the republic).
29 Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 863 (Pa. 2004).
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Most courts follow the first approach that inferior federal court
decisions are merely persuasive authority. A survey of some of the
recent cases in states that adopt the Persuasive Authority Theory is
instructive, as a doctrinal matter, to understand the reasoning behind
this approach. In Bogart v. CapRock Communications Corp.,3° the
Oklahoma Supreme Court stated firmly:
We also recognize that nothing in the concept of supremacy
or in any other principle of law requires subordination of
state courts to the inferior federal courts. Subject to
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, state courts
are free to promulgate judicial decisions grounded in their
own interpretation of federal law.31
In ACE Property Casualty & Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of
Revenue,32 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed that
Massachusetts would follow the Persuasive Authority Theory33 and
would "give respectful consideration to such lower Federal court
decisions as seem persuasive. 34 In Custom Microsystems, Inc. v.
Blake,35 the Arkansas Supreme Court flatly stated that "[t]he Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, of course, is not binding authority for this
court. 36 Other states that adhere to the Persuasive Authority Theory
include Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska,
New Jersey, Nevada, and Wisconsin.37
The prevailing rationale for the Persuasive Authority approach
among many states rests on the idea that states have concurrent
jurisdiction with inferior federal courts on issues of federal law. As
such, "state courts, when adjudicating federal questions, form an
integral part of the national judicial hierarchy and apply their own
law, not that of another sovereign." 38 Further, while the Supreme
Court maintains ultimate review of the issue, the lower federal courts
30 69 P.3d 266 (Okla. 2003).
31 Id. at 271 (relying on Akin v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 977 P.2d 1040, 1052 (Okla. 1998),
which held that because state courts and inferior federal courts were coordinate, not subordinate,
federal decisions of inferior federal courts were persuasive only).
32 770 N.E.2d 980 (Mass. 2002).
31 Id. at 986 n.8 ("[W]e are not bound by decisions of Federal courts (other than the
United States Supreme Court) on matters of Federal law.").
34 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Hill, 385 N.E.2d 253, 255 (Mass. 1979)).
35 42 S.W.3d 453 (Ark. 2001).
36 Id. at 457.
37 Hall v. Pa. Rd. of Prob. and Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 863-64 (Pa. 2004).
38 Authority in State Courts of Lower Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48

COLUM. L. REV. 943, 946 (1948) (citing Kersting v. Hardgrove, 48 A.2d 309 (Somerset County
Ct. 1946)).
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do not enjoy any ability of review of the state courts' pronouncements
on federal law. 39 Therefore, "[diecisions of a lower federal court are
no more binding on a state court than they are on a federal court not
beneath it in the judicial hierarchy." 4 Since state courts are
coordinate with federal courts, state court judgments on federal
questions are just as legitimate as federal court judgments, and there
is no inherent superiority that allows for federal courts to review the
state court. This rationale that lower federal courts have no reviewing
authority over the judgments of state courts has been affirmed by the
Supreme Court in what is called the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This
doctrine springs from the rule that federal district court jurisdiction is
"strictly original" and that district courts have no subject matter
jurisdiction to review a state court's determination of a federal
question absent a Congressional statute enabling such review, 41 and
that "[r]eview of such determinations can be obtained only in [the
Supreme] Court. ' 4 2 Based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the
Persuasive Theory finds its moorings: since state courts do not answer
to any lower federal court in the judicial hierarchy, state courts have
the discretion to treat the federal courts' opinions as persuasive
authority as they would any other nonsuperior court.43

A second school of thought, called here the Semi-Binding Theory,
is the doctrine that the state court owes the federal appeals court of
the circuit where the state is located a higher deference than merely
persuasive authority. Recognizing the problems in divergent bodies of
federal law, the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated that "[iut would
be a bizarre result if this court [adopted one analysis] when in another
courthouse, a few blocks away, the federal court, being bound by the
Second Circuit rule, required [a different analysis]. ' "4 As such, the
court adopted the analysis of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to
the federal law at issue.4 5 In Littlefield v. State, Departmentof Human
Services,4 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated that "in the
interests of existing harmonious federal-state relationships, it is a wise
policy that a state court of last resort accept, so far as reasonably

39 Id.

40 Id. at 947.
41 Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
42

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983).

43 For a recent endorsement and application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see Exxon

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
44 Red Maple Properties v. Zoning Comm'n, 610 A.2d 1238, 1242 n.7 (Conn. 1992)
(quoting Tedesco v. Stamford, 588 A.2d 656, 660 (Conn. 1991)).
45 Id.
46 480 A.2d 731 (Me. 1984).
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possible, a decision of its federal circuit court on such a federal
question. 47
While this doctrine certainly demonstrates deference to the
relevant federal court of appropriate jurisdiction, it falls short of
treating the federal decision as binding. The language is clear to leave
a theoretical "escape hatch" in the event the state court prefers a
different outcome under federal law. For example, in Littlefield, the
court is careful to reserve itself room to be as independent as it
ultimately wants to be: the court will adopt the federal court decision
"so far as reasonably possible." 48 But when would interpreting federal
law not be reasonably possible for a state court? What obstacles
would prevent a state court from adopting what is a pronouncement
on federal law by a competent court, outside of the preferred statutory
interpretations of the individual judges sitting on the state court
bench? In short, there is little obvious difference between this
approach and the Persuasive Authority Theory. The state court still
reserves the right to decide federal law any way it wants. What can be
gleaned from this approach, however, is that some courts are
concerned about a disharmony between a state version of federal law
and a federal version, at least when the state is within the
geographical jurisdiction of the federal court in question.
A third school of thought is that the state court is bound by inferior
federal court decisions but only when those decisions are "numerous
and consistent." In Bishop v. Burgard,49 the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that "[tihis court need not follow precedent of a particular
federal circuit court where, as here, the Supreme Court has not ruled
on the precise question presented, there is uncertainty among the
federal circuit courts of appeals, and we believe a case is wrongly
decided., 50 The implication is that where there is certainty in the
lower federal courts, the Illinois Supreme Court would need to follow
it. In Ex parte Bozeman, 5' the Alabama Supreme Court stated that "if
all federal circuits were in agreement on this issue, we would accept
the [federal courts' interpretation]., 52 And in Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag
Service, Inc.,53 the California Supreme Court held that "where the
decisions of the lower federal courts on a federal question are 'both

41 Id. at 737.
48

Id.

- 764 N.E.2d 24 (HI. 2002)
o Id. at 33.
5, 781 So. 2d 165 (Ala. 2000).
2 Id. at 168.
53 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000).
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numerous and consistent,' we should hesitate to reject their
authority." 54
It should be noted that this theory is still predicated on the idea that
the interpretation of federal law is essentially within the complete
control of the state court. The caveats offered by the state courts
adhering to this theory insure that they really have not accepted as
binding the decisions of lower federal court at all. After all, what
constitutes "uncertainty among the federal court"? Is it uncertainty
among district courts in the relevant jurisdiction? Is it uncertainty
among the circuit courts of appeals? Of course, the Alabama Supreme
Court was clear that the threshold for following federal decisions was
unanimity among the lower federal courts on the issue.55 What is the
likelihood that all the federal circuits would be in agreement on a
federal issue? In effect, the Alabama Supreme Court would spend
most of its time treating lower federal decisions are merely
persuasive.
Regardless of where an individual state court decided to draw and
apply a line of the "numerous and consistent" theory of analysis, it is
clear that state courts under this theory are concerned about
inconsistency of the meaning of federal law in the same jurisdiction.
California, Illinois, and Alabama have, at the very least, recognized
that it is in the best interests of the federal law not to have two
independent bodies of interpretation. It is arguable as to whether this
third school of thought actually ameliorates the problem with a
workable doctrine, but the concern is part of their jurisprudence, and
is a problem in need of a solution.
A fourth school of thought simply adopts lower federal court
interpretations of federal law as binding. In Columbus Paper &
Chemical, Inc. v. Chamberlin,56 the Mississippi Supreme Court held
that "[t]his Court, when enforcing rights created under federal law,
must follow the interpretations of those rights provided by federal
courts.

57

In Desmaris v. Joy Manufacturing Co.,58 the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire stated that "we note that in exercising our
jurisdiction with respect to what is essentially a federal question, we
are guided and bound by federal statutes and decisions of the federal
courts interpreting those statutes. 5 9
54 Id. at 368.
55 Ex Parte Bozeman, 781 So. 2d at 168.
56

687 So. 2d 1143 (Miss. 1996).

57 Id. at 1147.

58538 A.2d 1218 (N.H. 1988).
59 Id. at 1220.
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But neither court discusses any policy reasons for their decision to
treat federal court decisions on federal law as binding. It could be.
considered a matter of administrative convenience. Instead of an
original, painstaking analysis of the law, the state courts more quickly
and more easily reach decisions by applying the work already done by
other courts. It could be considered a matter of deference to federal
courts in that they are presumed to have more expertise in matters of
federal law. Whatever the reason, both Mississippi and New
Hampshire see value in treating federal decisions as binding.
In sum, the four schools of thought elucidated in Hall v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole demonstrate that, by
and large, most state courts adopt a doctrine that federal court
interpretations of federal law are, more or less, merely persuasive, and
the differences arise only in what degree the state court should be
deferential. Only two states have stated that they treat lower federal
court decisions as binding, and they did not expound on the matter.
Given the four schools of thought examined in Hall v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole and the myriad of
possible variations, an important question needs to be asked: which
method of interpretation is better? Which doctrine of deciding federal
law serves the interests of the federal law best? This Note argues that
Mississippi and New Hampshire have the superior doctrine of
interpretation: marching in lockstep with the federal circuit court in
their respective federal jurisdiction.
1II. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: WHAT GOALS SHOULD THE
COURTS SEEK TO ACCOMPLISH?

The history is clear that there is no historical or textual
determination that state courts are bound by federal precedent in their
circuit on questions of federal law. Modern courts are still of a mind
that they can interpret federal law any way they see fit. But practical
problems arise that create challenges to public policy when state
courts create their own version of federal law unencumbered by
federal precedent. Mirroring the concerns that led to the Erie doctrine
used by federal courts interpreting state law in diversity cases,
problems arise when the federal law in a given jurisdiction has
multiple meanings dependent on the court. First, there are concerns
about the abuses of forum shopping. Second, there are concerns about
consistency in the law. Third, in a day and age where federal law is so
prominent in its scope, the chances of creating disputes in the law that
must ultimately be settled by the Supreme Court are higher, thus
creating inefficiencies and confusion in the judiciary.
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A. Forum Shopping
When state courts are allowed to decide federal matters completely
independent of the interpretations of the federal court whose
jurisdiction the state court resides within, the lack of uniformity in the
federal law encourages forum shopping. That forum shopping is an
undesirable practice is recognized in one of the seminal Supreme
Court cases of the twentieth century. The abuses of forum shopping
were a major policy concern that led to the adoption of the Erie
doctrine in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.60 The Court recognized
that under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, which allowed unrestrained
forum shopping between state and federal courts on a matter of state
law through diversity jurisdiction, rights varied according to whether
the enforcement was sought in a state or federal court.6 1 Moreover,
this lack of uniformity of rights based on forum choice under Swift
"rendered impossible equal protection of the law." 62 The Erie Court
announced that federal courts were bound to adhere to the state's
highest court interpretation of the state law rather than independently
develop one of their own. Although the holding rested on the rule that
"[t]here is no federal general common law" 63 and the idea that the

Constitution confers no power to federal courts to independently
interpret state law matter in a diversity suit, the case was decided with
a desire to decrease the abuses of forum shopping. 64
The Erie doctrine demonstrates that forum shopping is a practice
to be discouraged. There is an innate sense of unfairness when the
outcome of a trial turns on the choice of forum rather than on the
merits of the law and facts in a given case. 65 Further, not only does
the inherent inconsistency in two independent bodies of law raise
questions of equal protection because of its unfairness 66 but it also
creates other practical problems. Forum shopping leads to
inefficiency: "[t]he more the two sides in a lawsuit see the costs or
outcome depending on [the court] where the case is litigated, the
more there will be fights over venue and jurisdiction., 67 Aggressive
wrangling over which type of court the law will be litigated in

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 74-75.
62 Id. at 75.
63 Id. at 78.
64 Id. at 74-78.
60
61

65

Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46

MERCER L. REV. 757, 782 (1995).
66 Erie, 304 U.S. at 75.
67

Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 65, at 782.
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naturally leads to lengthy and costly fights over location. 68 Moreover,
because lawyers must familiarize themselves with the procedural
requirements depending on the court, this adds to the inefficiency of
litigation.69
The forum shopping problems addressed in diversity cases by Erie
also arise when states decide questions of federal law in a way
inconsistent with federal court decisions. The issue at hand is nothing
more than a reversed Erie dilemma. Litigants can now do exactly
what Erie tried to prevent in diversity jurisdiction lawsuits: they can
shop for the forum that best suits their preferences based on the
differences in the law itself as adjudicated by different courts.
Erie makes clear that forum shopping is not desirable as public
policy and should be remedied. If unbridled forum shopping in a
diversity lawsuit created intolerable "mischievous results" 70 in Erie, it
certainly follows that the same mischievous results are something to
be avoided when there is a choice between state or federal court
interpretations of a federal law. But how? Unlike Erie, there is no
constitutional mechanism to blunt the pernicious effects of forum
shopping by demanding that state courts follow an inferior federal
court's ruling on federal law. It has been well established that state
courts are not constitutionally required to follow an inferior's court's
ruling on a federal matter. As such, forum shopping remains open to
abuse so long as state courts interpret federal law without regard to
any precedent by a federal court. Discouraging forum shopping is a
policy that state courts should adopt, but the current policy of
deciding federal matters free of any precedential restraints does
nothing to systematically address the problem.
B. Consistency and Uniformity
Consistency in the interpretation of law is one of the hallmarks of
the American legal system. Just as the Constitution outlaws ex post
facto laws 71 as a matter of fundamental fairness, 72 the values
underpinning consistency in law-predictability, transparency, and
rationality-are all essential to a successful legal system. 73 Further,
the very concept of the use of precedent in our legal system is built on
the idea that like cases should be treated alike: "[w]e achieve fairness
68 Id. at 783.
69Id.
70 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
71 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
72 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 396-97 (1798) (discussing ex post facto laws).
73 Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values
of ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE LJ. 455,485 (1986).
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by decisionmaking rules designed to achieve consistency across a
range of decisions. 7 4 While consistency and predictability in
application of the law cannot be achieved with mathematical
precision, it is a goal fundamental to the American conception of rule
of law.75 After all, the basic function of certiorari jurisdiction is to
establish uniformity on questions of federal law.76
When state courts develop their own interpretation of federal laws
free of any influence of the federal court decisions in the appropriate
district, the goal of consistency in the federal law is thwarted. In the
Sixth Circuit, for example, Kentucky, Ohio, Michigan, and Tennessee
could all have their independent version of what a federal law means
along with the prevailing authority of the federal courts in the circuit.
Having the possibility, in the case of the Sixth Circuit, of five distinct
interpretations of a federal law does not promote consistency or
uniformity in the federal law. Theoretically, two neighbors located on
the same street could have completely different applications of the
same federal law, all because of this inconsistency in the way it is
construed between independent state and federal courtrooms. This
asymmetry between state and federal courts is an obstacle to the
decisional uniformity desired by the Supreme Court.77
C. Efficiency.
A third problem is that the Supreme Court does not have the
practical ability to smooth out these inconsistencies in the federal law,
despite such suggestions by some commentators. In theory, the
Supreme Court, as the court of last resort on all questions of federal
law, can resolve any conflicting interpretations of federal law
achieving national uniformity because state courts are bound by the
Supreme Court. In the case of a state court interpreting federal law,
the argument goes, there is no fear that two distinct bodies of law
could emerge because the Supreme Court can ultimately resolve the
dispute.78
But this theoretical view ignores the kind of practical problems
that give rise to divergence in the law. It is true that "only a decision
74 Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571,596 (1987).
75 Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46

STAN. L. REv. 817, 852 (1994).
76 Robert L. Stem, Comment, Denial of CertiorariDespite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REV.
465, 465 (1953) (analyzing the various reasons the Supreme Court will not grant certiorari
despite conflicts in the lower courts).
77 Andrew A. Matthews, Jr., The State Courts and the Federal Common Law, 27 ALB. L.
REv. 73, 76 (1963).
78 Id.
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of the Supreme Court... can completely assure uniformity of federal
common law.",79 However, as a practical matter, "it is highly
improbable that the Supreme Court could effectively undertake the
development of detailed substantive rules of law. 8 ° Writing in 1951,
a commentator noted that time limits the number of cases which the
Court can decide. 8' Even when there are conflicts in the circuit courts,
the Court82 has practical constraints on being able to resolve the
problem.
Of course, that was in 1951. According the Supreme Court's
website, the Court had 1,460 cases on the docket in 1945.83 In 1960,
the number of cases on the docket jumped to 2,313. 84 The current
total is now more than 7,000 cases per term, nearly seven times that
of the presumably overburdened Supreme Court of the 1940s and
'50s. 85 Couple that with the fact that we have over fifty titles to the
U.S. Code.
So, in the modem era, we have exponentially more federal laws
and exponentially more judicial opinions that must interpret those
laws. The simple solution that the Supreme Court can neatly tidy up
all these disputes because it happens to have jurisdiction over all
federal questions is faulty in light of our modem circumstances. It
follows that because of these practical restraints, a problematic
divergence exists in the law and threatens to get worse. If it is
ostensibly bad policy to have such divergent interpretations of federal
law, and it is clear that we think so because of the policy
considerations in Erie, then it stands to reason that a solution must be
applied at a lower level rather than waiting on the Supreme Court to
rescue the law from itself.
If these public policy concerns were sufficient for the Supreme
Court to consider an Erie doctrine for federal courts interpreting state
law, it stands to reason that state courts interpreting federal law
should see the wisdom in creating a doctrine that improves the quality
and consistency of interpreting federal law. But, the Erie doctrine
differed in one respect because the Supreme Court believed that the
Constitution did not confer the unrestricted power to interpret state
law on the federal courts.86 State courts, in contrast, have no
79

Id. at 75.

8 Id.
81 The Supreme Court, 1950 Term, 65 HARV. L. REV. 107, 108 (1951).
82 See Stem, supra note 76.
83 The Justices' Caseload (2005), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/justicecaseload.
pdf.
84Id.
85 Id.

86 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("There is no federal general
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constitutional requirement to follow federal precedent of the circuit
court for their jurisdiction. In other words, there is no serious
argument that state courts independently interpreting federal law is
unconstitutional.
So we are left, as a practical matter, to decide if the current
doctrines of state courts are tolerable in light of our Erie-esque public
policy concerns. This Note suggests that there is a better way, a
"lockstep" approach: one advocated by the supreme courts of
Mississippi and New Hampshire, and one that is consistent with state
court jurisprudence in the interpretation of state Bills of Rights. While
this doctrine cannot be imposed on a state court, this Note argues that
state courts, as a common law and policy matter, should choose this
doctrine because it helps alleviate the Erie-esque public policy
concerns "in the reverse"; that is, when a state court has to interpret
federal law. The doctrine suggested here-the Lockstep Doctrine-is
one in which states treat circuit court decisions as binding on
questions of federal law as if the circuit court were a superior court.
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR THE LOCKSTEP DOCTRINE

Simply stated, a lockstep approach means that one court adopts
wholesale the ruling of another court for public policy reasons, even
when the first court has no duty to bind itself to the ruling. This is not
the same as treating
the second court's ruling as persuasive and
87
following suit.
A. State Constitutionalism.
State supreme courts routinely engage in lockstep jurisprudence as
a doctrinal matter in some their most important work: interpretation
of their own state constitutions and more specifically, the states'
respective Bills of Rights.8 8 In theory, the state supreme court,
interpreting its own Bill of Rights, has authority to interpret the Bill
of Rights completely independent of any United States Supreme
Court decision on a federal version of the law. But, in practice, state
supreme courts do not adopt this independent approach. Instead,
though they are not required to by any superior law or court, the state
supreme court adopts the United States Supreme Court's

common law.").
87 See Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism,496 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 98 (1988).
98 See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,90 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 788 (1992).
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interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights as their own for the state's
Bill of Rights. This state court approach of following the Supreme
Court is referred to as the lockstep method.89
State supreme courts have routinely opted to follow in lockstep
with the Supreme Court's rulings on civil rights despite suggestions
that the state courts should expand civil rights and liberties beyond
that of the Supreme Court's rulings by way of independent
adjudication of their own constitutions. 90 There are many examples of
this fidelity to lockstep jurisprudence in the corpus of state court
decisions. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, when
adjudicating claims relying solely on the state constitution, has
applied the Supreme Court's constitutional standards for a variety of
issues, including probable cause, evidence suppression, retroactivity
of decision for jury instructions, and urinalysis. 9 1 In claims where the
litigant raised both state and federal constitutional claims, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the Supreme Court's
standards governed the state's constitutional standards in such areas
as due process, fair trial, use immunity, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, and search and seizure issues. 92 Virginia, Louisiana,
Kansas, and New York all defer to the idea that the federal standards
enunciated by the Supreme Court control the analysis and outcome
under the state constitution to some degree.93
Further, as Professor Gardner notes, even as the California
Constitution expressly invites the California Supreme Court to
develop independent jurisprudence on state constitutional issues, 94 the
California Supreme Court, as a doctrinal choice, has opted for the
lockstep approach on issues such as the right to a public trial, due
process, and the disproportionality of the death sentence.95
Why state supreme courts adopt the lockstep is less clear, as state
courts almost never explain their reasoning behind it. 96 The Virginia
Supreme Court "refuse[d] to give any broader interpretation to the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution of Virginia," but went no
89William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutionsas Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550-51 (1986).
90 See id. This idea of 'New Federaism'-the idea that state courts should assert their
independence when interpreting a state's bill of rights to expand civil liberties-was analyzed
by Supreme Court Justice Brennan. See William Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
ProtectionofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
91 Gardner, supranote 88, at 789 n. 105.
92 Id. at 788-89.
93 Id. at 789-92.
94 Id. at 789 ("Rights guaranteed by [California's] Constitution are not dependent on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.") (citing CAL. CONST. art. L § 24).
91 Id. at 790.
96 Id. at 792.
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further.97 In People v. Hernandez,98 the Court of Appeals of New
York, without much elaboration, asserted that the state equal
protection clause produced the same protection of law that the federal
equal protection clause and that in this case, "no justification for
breaking new ground as to [the state] clause by differentiating
between this dually protected constitutional right is sufficiently
advanced." 99 While the New York court seems to leave the door open
that a justification could be raised to differentiate the state and federal
equal protection laws, it is clear that the New York court seems
comfortably settled on the idea that the state supreme court's
jurisprudence will remain in lockstep with the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Ohio, too, practices the lockstep approach with regards to its state
Bill of Rights. In Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, the Ohio Supreme
Court faced a First Amendment claim regarding picketing and
leafleting in a privately-owned shopping mall. 1°° Even though the
United States Supreme Court held that states could come to their own
conclusions and expand free-speech liberties in malls,' °1 the Ohio
Supreme Court held that "free speech guarantees accorded by the
Ohio Constitution are no broader than the First Amendment, and that
the First Amendment is the proper basis for interpretation of Section
11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.' 0 2
B. Rationales
However, in the absence of explanations, some commonsense
rationales come to mind. An obvious theory is that state supreme
courts choose to defer to a court that has perhaps a better
understanding and expertise on the types of issues being raised on a
constitutional claim. Since the Federal Constitution is more fully
expounded, both in court cases and academic literature, the bulk of
federal constitutional materials "provides a generous source of
off-the-shelf standards and analyses for application to state
constitutional problems."103 As such, state judges do not have to "start
97 R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Comm. for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 391 S.E.2d
587,591 (Va. 1990).
552 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1990).
99 Id. at 624.
1- 626 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1994).
101
Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) ("Our reasoning in Lloyd,
however, does not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power
or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution.").
102 Eastwood Mall,

103Gardner,

626 N.E.2d at 61.

supra note 88, at 791.
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at the beginning" when interpreting their own state constitutions;
there is less of a need to plumb the depths of their own state's
constitutional history, exhaustively search the legislative records for
the intent of several generations of legislatures, or divine the direction
of the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society ' °0' of the people of their particular state when an
obviously able court has done this kind of work for them.
Further, state and federal constitutions often contain substantially
similar language, given they share similar points of origin in history
and society. This, logically, would give rise to theoretical and
doctrinal symmetry between the two sources of law. As such, some
suggest that it only makes sense for state courts to start with a federal
analysis and depart from it only for clearly defined reasons.10 5
A combination of reasons is plausible. For reasons of consistency,
practicality, and efficiency, state supreme courts think the best
approach is to adopt the Supreme Court's law as its own on what are
state constitutional questions. The quality of justice is improved when
state judges do not have to "reinvent the wheel" on questions that
have already been considered by the most prominent court in the
American legal system. The lockstep approach is clearly a preferred
method of adjudicating state constitutional claims and is a common
phenomenon across a variety of states.
Considering that the lockstep approach is an approach in which the
state courts are quite comfortable, it stands to reason that if a state
supreme court is deferring to the expertise of a federal court in
interpreting law that is a pure creation of and by the state itself, it
would make eminent sense for a state supreme court to have the same
kind of deference, for all the same public policy reasons, to federal
courts in matters of federal law. The rationale behind the lockstep
doctrine is well settled, and despite plenty of opportunities to strike an
independent path on state constitutional questions, state supreme
courts have chosen not to do so, deciding in the state's best interest to
march in lockstep with the Supreme Court. For the same reasons, this
same judicial practice should be applied to federal questions in a state
court.

104Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
105See Developments in the Law: The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95
HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1330-31 (1982) (discussing the 'interstitial' approach to state
constitutional adjudication).
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V. BENEFITS OF THE LOCKSTEP DOCTRINE

Far from being a radical departure from current interpretation or
suggesting a drastic overturning of fundamental state jurisprudence,
because of its settled nature as a doctrine, applying this lockstep
approach to state interpretations of federal law would be a natural,
consistent way of handling the kinds of public policy problems that
arise from divergence in federal law between state and federal courts.
A. Combating Forum Shopping Abuses
First, the lockstep doctrine will slow the forum shopping abuses
discussed in Erie. It should be noted that the point of Erie was not to
eliminate forum shopping entirely. It did not get rid of diversity
jurisdiction and state questions are still available to be adjudicated 1°
in6
either state or federal court, so long as diversity criteria are met.
Erie wanted to prevent forum shopping based on lack of uniformity in
the law. °7 Similarly, the lockstep doctrine here will curtail forum
selection on the basis of the substantive law, as the prevailing state of
a federal law in the relevant circuit jurisdiction will be the same in a
state court as it would be had the case been brought in a federal court.
As in a diversity jurisdiction matter, litigants are free to choose a
forum based on other factors, such as procedural laws. Erie had no
objective to demand a harmonization of all considerations in choice
of forum, and the Lockstep Doctrine is consistent with that view. But,
as discussed above, Erie wanted to put a stop to forum shopping
within a single state based on the substantive law, 0 8 and in light of
that being a problem in need of a solution for state law questions in
diversity, forum shopping on the basis of substantive federal law is
also a problem to be remedied. The Lockstep Doctrine creates that
remedy in the same way the Erie Doctrine did.
B. Improving Uniformity
Second, the Lockstep Doctrine improves consistency,
predictability, and ultimately uniformity in the federal law. There has
always been a desire to achieve a level of uniformity in the federal
law. Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist: "Thirteen
independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising
upon the same laws, is a hydra in government from which nothing but
106
U.S. CONST. arL. f1, § 2.
107
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-78 (1938).
08John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1087, 1116 (1992)
("Erie sought to discourage that kind of legal inconsistency within a state.").
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contradiction and confusion can proceed."' 1 9 Of course, Hamilton was
discussing the problem of thirteen states. Now, of course, we have
almost four times the number of heads of hydra that worried
Hamilton, as well as exponentially more federal laws that must be
given meaning by judges. The Lockstep Doctrine, by applying the
relevant federal court's ruling in place of an independent state court's
analysis, helps tame the beast Hamilton worried about in Federalist
No. 80: federal law whose meaning was so splintered among varying
jurisdictions that no one knew what the law meant." 0
From a practical lawyering standpoint, a lawyer can more
effectively advise his client as to the law not only when his client gets
sued, but more importantly, before that, when the lawyer's client is
trying to comply with the law to prevent from being sued in a state
that adopts the Lockstep Doctrine for federal questions in state
court."' Without the built-in consistency of the lockstep approach,
this task becomes much harder and much more expensive.
Furthermore, a state court that refuses to follow as binding federal
courts' interpretations of federal law offer an opportunity for its
residents to be the victim of a legal "sneak attack."
On a larger scale, when the law can mean two different things
based on forum choice in the same jurisdiction, there is a concern that
this approach does not comport with the principles of fair play and
equal justice. This is the kind of unevenness the Erie Court described
as flirting with unequal protection of the law.' 12 While the Erie Court
stopped short of deciding Erie under an equal protection theory, the
109THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (G. Carey ed. 2001).
10 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816) ("If there were no
revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into
uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in
different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or
efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would
be truly deplorable[.]"). Though the Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee was clearly
referencing the result of a state court decision being ineligible for review by the Supreme Court
on a question arising under the United States Constitution, the fair point is that uniformity is
preferred over such "jarring and discordant judgments" within the laws of the United States.
M The theory that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" is well settled among
attorneys trying to avoid costly and time-consuming litigation. See, e.g., Marcos D. Jimenez &
Dana Foster, The Importance of Compliance Programsfor the Health Care Industry, 7 U.
MIAMI BUS. L. REv. 503 (1999) (noting the importance of a good compliance program to avoid
litigation for clients in the health care industry); Kevin B. Huff, The Role of Corporate
CompliancePrograms in Determining CorporateCriminalLiability: A Suggested Approach, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 1252 (1996) (analyzing the benefits of compliance in the context of criminal
liability for corporations); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure:
Developing Sound Policiesfor Environmental Compliance Programs, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REv. 583 (1996) (noting that as both criminal and civil penalties for environmental infractions
get ever more severe, compliance with the law is the superior alternative).
112Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
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Court kept the door open to a consideration that a lack of uniformity
was discriminatory:
[The Swift doctrine] made rights enjoyed under the unwritten
'general law' vary according to whether enforcement was
sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of
selecting the court in which the right should be determined
was conferred upon the non-citizen. Thus, the doctrine
rendered impossible equal protection of the law. In
attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the
United States, the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the
administration of the law of the State. The discrimination
resulting became in practice far-reaching. 113
While it is difficult to speculate on the success of such a claim,
application of the Lockstep Doctrine would preempt that troubling
discussion by remedying the kinds of concerns the Erie Court
mentioned. In the Hall case, regardless of the forum in which Hall
chose to make his appeal, and regardless of the reasons why-after
all, the appeal was done pro se, so it stands to reason Hall might
choose a forum based on convenience or accessibility, rather than
tactics or strategy-had the Pennsylvania Court adopted as binding
the Third Circuit's view of the law, there would be no question Hall
would have his federal claim decided the same as any similarly
situated appellant in federal court. That approach would create a
consistent result regardless of forum, the question of unfairness would
be foreclosed, and the Lockstep Doctrine would generate this
outcome.
C. Improving the Quality of Adjudication
Third, under the Lockstep Doctrine, state courts can do their part
to improve the quality in the adjudication of federal laws. While it has
been stated that state courts are competent to hear federal questions,' 14
the concept of parity-that is, the assumption that state courts are just
as capable of doing a good a job as a federal court in adjudicating a
federal law-has been questioned in light of the development of
federal laws over time. First, there is the idea that federal judges are
of a higher caliber because they are selected from a narrower pool of
potential appointees, and therefore comprise a bench of higher legal

113Id.
1

4

See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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talent than the state bench would.1 5 As such, it is argued that federal
judges are simply the best and brightest among a broader field of
adjudicators.' 1 6 Further, the selection process of federal judges tends
to insure that federal judges are of a "higher professional distinction":
the focus of a federal appointment is on the competence and skill of
the nominated judge, whereas a state election has less to do with an
exacting review of competence and more to do with rounding up
votes and political patronage.' 7 Also, it is argued that the caliber of
judicial clerks "exerts a substantial impact on the quality of judicial
output," and clerks serving at the federal level are themselves8
considered to be among the best and brightest of their peers."
Finally, it is argued that the caseload of state courts is so much larger
than that of the federal courts, and that state courts could not possibly
give the time, attention, and rigorous analysis required that a nonstate
question of law deserves." 9 It follows that even if state and federal
judges were of equal ability, this institutional difference
in the courts
120
results in better adjudication at the federal level.
Other commentary supporting the idea that parity does not in fact
exist is much more candid and blunt. As Judge Guido Calabresi of the
Second Circuit recently opined:
The intermediate courts of any state have other things that
they must be more concerned with. [State judges] are not
experts on federal law, and, with great respect to them, they
are not good at it. Moreover, they
are not all that interested in
21
federal law, nor should they be.'
Even the American Law
parity in practice, noting
considerable expertness
federal law which
would
122
state courts."'

Institute has weighed in on the limits of
that "[tihe federal courts have acquired a
in the interpretation and application of
be lost of federal questions were given to

ll5 See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1121 (1977).
However, the idea that federal judges are of higher caliber remains under debate. See Michael E.
Solimine, The Future of Parity,46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1457 (2005).
116
Neubome, supranote 115, at 1122.
7

1 1d.
8

" Id.
19

1 1d. at 1122-23.
120
Id.
121Guido Calabresi, Federaland State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1293, 1304 (2003).
22

1 AMERICAN LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND

FEDERAL COURTS 164-65 (1969).
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That is not to say that everyone agrees that parity between state
and federal questions does not exist-far from it. 23 But at a bare
minimum, the growth and evolution of the federal law since the
Founding suggests that while state courts are competent to hear
federal questions as a matter of law, 124 there are growing concerns, as
indicated above, that changing circumstances-more laws, more
complexity-have rendered state courts less equipped to adjudicate
federal questions with the highest degree of quality deserving of the
federal law as a practical and a policy matter.
It is not the purpose of this Note to resolve the debate on whether
or not there is parity between state and federal courts, but rather to
demonstrate that the Lockstep Doctrine assuages any concerns that
state courts are compromising the federal law with their inevitable
inexpertness. If we are truly interested in achieving the highest quality
of adjudication of federal law available, and we continue to be open
to the argument that federal courts have obvious advantages in
providing that higher quality of federal law interpretation, the need
for state courts to adopt a Lockstep Doctrine is paramount. The
Doctrine leverages the expertise of the federal courts so that the
federal law and its judicial construction is the best available.
VI. CONTOURS OF THE LOCKSTEP DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE

Practical problems with any theory naturally arise and the
Lockstep Doctrine is no different. For example, should state courts
follow as binding rulings made by federal district courts? If so, what
about states that have multiple federal districts where there are several
district courts to choose from? What about a federal issue that has
already been decided by a state court? Should the state reverse its
current interpretation if the federal court sees the federal law a
different way?
First, this Note suggests that state courts should specifically treat
as binding the rulings of the circuit court of the circuit in which the
state is situated. In this sense, the state court becomes the equivalent
of another federal district court. The state court would view other
federal district court rulings as persuasive and would be bound by the
law of circuit court decisions. As an illustration, the state courts of
Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee, and Kentucky would all treat as binding
123See generally Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981) (arguing that state courts are competent to hear federal
constitutional questions and should continue to play a substantial role in the elaboration of
federal constitutional principles).

124Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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the decisions of the Sixth Circuit on federal questions; all other
federal court decisions would be considered persuasive. Under this
arrangement, it can truly be said that the state court is coordinate with
the federal courts, since the state courts function as the equivalent of
the federal district courts. While there is merit in suggesting that even
federal district court judges have better qualifications to decide issues
of federal law, even at the trial level, this arrangement strikes a decent
compromise to respect the state court's ability to hear federal
questions and the need for public policy benefits afforded by
marching in lockstep with the circuit court. Also, instead of attacking
the notion of parity, the Lockstep Doctrine actually acknowledges it
and refines the idea. State courts are still as competent as they ever
were to hear federal questions, but like their federal district court
counterparts, they will be bound to follow the law of the circuit court
because of the public policy dividends such an arrangement provides.
No one seriously questions a federal district court's competence
because it must follow in lockstep with the circuit court, and the same
applies to a state court under the Lockstep Doctrine. And, just as
federal district courts rely on the expertise of the circuit court, so
would the state court. In sum, the state court would take on the role of
a federal district court, and it would not be a radical transformation.
State courts are now bound to follow the United States Supreme
Court, and the Lockstep Doctrine would only move that obligation
one "rung" down the hierarchy of courts to include the circuit court.
As for whether or not previous decisions by the state court made
on federal questions should be overturned to follow a circuit court's
decision, this Note suggests that the state court should, in future cases
addressing previously ruled upon federal questions, adopt the circuit
court's decision as the controlling one. Though it can be argued that
this is a daunting task, there is a concern that unless the state court
reverses course and corrects its previous decisions on federal
questions to go in the direction of the circuit court, the two paths of
federal law will continue to diverge and create the kinds of concerns
previously addressed. 125
As for creating the Lockstep Doctrine, this Note has suggested that
state courts adopt the Doctrine as a matter of judicial construction
through the common law. As the previous cases have demonstrated,
state courts have been deferring to federal courts as a matter of
126
judicial
interpretation.
However,
is the possibility
of having
the Lockstep
Doctrine enacted
as there
legislation.
States could
create
supra PartM.
See supra Part IV.

125See
2
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jurisdictional requirements for state courts on their own. Federal
legislation could be more problematic, as concerns of federalism and
constitutionality could be raised because state courts- courts created
other sovereign entities-would have their powers determined by the
Congress. Though these issues are beyond the scope of this Note, a
legislative approach to the Lockstep Doctrine is conceivable.
VII. ADDRESSING FEDERALISM AND OTHER CONCERNS

Critics might argue that such an approach chips away at state's
rights or tilts the balance of federalism too much for their liking.
Moreover, they might argue that diversity of viewpoints in the law
can ostensibly be good thing. This Note argues that while federalism,
states' rights, and diversity are good in a nation as large as the United
States, these issues do not defeat the Doctrine. First, as for states'
rights, there is no suggesting that states must apply this Doctrine.
State courts still have the power they always had, so unlike the Erie
doctrine, there is no compulsion. This Doctrine is hinged upon the
benefits it provides as an interpretive device, as a workable solution
to public policy concerns that are likely to arise as too many bodies of
law exist interpreting federal law. Second, federalism is not under
attack. Nothing in the doctrine suggests that states must somehow
defer to federal courts on issues of state law. Although, as noted
above, doing so is not unusual. States retain their sovereignty and
their courts retain their inherent power to determine their own laws;
this doctrine is merely another tool in their bag of judicial approaches
that generates positive dividends for consistency in the law.
As for a diversity of viewpoints in the interpretation of the federal
law: while a diversity of approaches is good in theory, too much
diversity is the antithesis of the "rule of law," in which every
individual should be treated fairly and equally in the same jurisdiction
as a matter of law. An overreach of diverse views creates situations
where two people similarly situated are treated completely differently
not because of the facts of their respective cases but solely on
divergent interpretations of the law. Such an approach does not
comport with the objectives of our system of laws, which prefers
some diversity but not arbitrariness and inconsistency disguised as
diversity. Moreover, while the virtue of "percolation"-that it is
ostensibly good for the law to go through a back-and-forth debate
with conflicting interpretations before the Supreme Court grants
certiorari-is often cited as a good reason for diversity in approaches
to federal law, it is not without its limits. The Supreme Court's
limited resources "make it incapable of remedying all the distortions
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introduced into national law by the competition between geographical
and specialist institutions."' 27 As such, too much "percolation" creates
a situation in which there may develop incurable distortions and
"[t]hese are troubling developments for a nation committed, as ours
is, to the rule of law."12 8 To remedy these fears, a balance between
diversity and uniformity is important, and this Note suggests that the
Lockstep Doctrine assists in achieving that balance by preventing a
descent into the extreme margins of too much diversity.
Further, some have suggested other alternatives to solving the
"divergent bodies of federal law" problem that the Lockstep Doctrine
purports to address. Professor Donald Zeigler considers the public
policy considerations above and proposes a methodology of
interpretation: state courts should interpret federal law by making an
intelligent prediction of how the Supreme Court would construe the
law. 129 Zeigler recognizes that state courts can essentially adopt any
approach they want but recommends that the state court "slip into the
shoes" of the United States Supreme Court and try to interpret the
federal law the way the High Court would. Zeigler notes that since
uniformity in the federal law is a goal, "considering how the Supreme
Court would130 decide the issue should provide a unifying
perspective.'
But arguably any court interpreting federal law, knowing full well
that the United States Supreme Court enjoys plenary review of all
federal questions, will always rule with an eye toward how the
Supreme Court would rule? This is not much of a solution. Any court
inferior to the United States Supreme Court should be taking this
approach when dealing with a federal question. In reality, Professor
Zeigler's approach differs little from Persuasive Theory. The state
courts continue to enjoy the complete independence that it currently
does, and they would continue to do what they have already been
doing, namely making decisions knowing that the United State
Supreme Court is standing over their shoulder. In short, the state
courts are already doing what Professor Zeigler is suggesting and the
problem of "divergent bodies of federal law" continues unabated.
Professor Zeigler's solution is merely the status quo. And, as this

127Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implicationsof the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources of Judicial Review for Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093,
1117 (1987).
8
12 Id. at 1116.
29Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State
Judges Should Use to Ascertain FederalLaw, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1143, 1184 (1999).
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Note argues, the status quo is exactly what is giving rise to the kinds
of problems the Lockstep Doctrine has been offered to fix.
CONCLUSION

In sum, the Lockstep Doctrine is designed to build an interpretive
arrangement that brings improved consistency, quality, and fairness to
the federal law in a given federal circuit. The focus of this Note's
argument is that far from being a radical proposal, the concept of
lockstep jurisprudence is not at all unfamiliar to state courts; indeed,
it is considered a valuable judicial tool.13 1 Applying the Lockstep

Doctrine used so often by state supreme courts in matters of
adjudicating state-created constitutional rights to federal questions
introduced into state courtrooms makes eminent sense for all the same
policy reasons. The argument that "state courts should do it their own
way because they can" is incomplete. The question is not what state
courts can do, but rather, what should state courts do with all the
options available? Mississippi and New Hampshire have opted for a
version of the Lockstep Doctrine. The sooner the other forty-eight
states elect to do the same, the sooner an important step will be taken
to improving the adjudication of the federal law in an era where the
federal law continues to expand.
M. JASON HALE
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See supra Part IV.
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